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Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from 
moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and 
sentience in these organisms.  The implied association between consciousness and moral standing 
is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are 
dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current 
neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for 
deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.  
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Issues concerning who or what has ‘moral standing’ are related to questions of who or what is a 
person, not (directly at least) to whether an entity has the capacity for consciousness. As pointed 
out by Locke (1689/1694), ‘person’ is a ‘forensick’ (i.e. legal) notion, which is why bridges, 
churches, corporations, and non-rational animals, including insects, have at one time or another 
been afforded the status of persons historically. Animal welfare laws, by contrast, are targeted 
at things which have a ‘well-being’, and seek inter alia to protect organisms from unjustifiable, 
unnecessary or unreasonable pain. When thinking about our moral obligations to nonhuman 
animals, it is crucial to be clear on what sort of harm is at issue and to recognise that although 
they are obviously connected, the terms ‘harm’ and ‘pain’ are by no means coextensive. 
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Contrary to what Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) suggest, a species that lacks the 
capacity for consciousness need not lack intrinsic (non-instrumental) value any more than 
churches or corporations that are recognised as legal persons do. We should not let our desire to 
see protections extended to species phylogenetically distant from humans shape the way we 
interpret neuroscientific findings. Although we see M&P’s target article as providing an excellent 
starting point for robust discussion about the capabilities of insects and their value, M&P’s 
conclusions exceed the neuroscientific evidence on which they rely. 
M&P build a prima facie case for the moral standing of arthropods on the grounds that 
they have a "psychological welfare of their own”.  Arthropods have a centralised brain and they 
exhibit "rich forms of cognition" and flexible, complex behaviours.  Confusingly, M&P state at one 
point that neither cognition nor complex behaviours are "necessary conditions for moral 
standing, since creatures may be sentient even if they lack, say, numerosity, transitive inference, 
or problem solving".  We agree, having raised similar concerns previously (Key, 2015, 2016; Key 
and Brown, 2018).  Although there are different working definitions of ‘cognition’, the consensus 
is that it involves the planning and execution of complex behaviours to solve a problem or to 
achieve a goal.  In humans, cognition involves both conscious higher-order functions (Miller and 
Wallis, 2009) and non-conscious information processing (LeDoux and Brown, 2017). The latter is 
necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. Failure to recognise this distinction leads M&P to 
conclude falsely that all complex behaviours are under volitional control—that arthropod 
behaviour is "probably underwritten" by sentience or subjective experience (e.g. pleasure and 
pain), simply because it is mediated by information processing. 
Unfortunately, no evidence that sentience is necessary for cognition or the "flexible 
learning abilities” of arthropods is provided. M&P assume that all complex behaviours depend 
on the ability of organisms to "attach feelings to objects and actions". There is a circular quality 
to their reasoning here. Having bestowed sentient qualities on flexible learning behaviours, they 
infer from observing those behaviours that arthropods are sentient—e.g., "bumblebees tend to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli more optimistically after exposure to a pleasant stimulus, just as 
humans do when they are happy or calm". The intentionalist language of ‘interpretation’ and 
‘pleasantness’ of the stimuli and the analogy with human happiness and tranquility are question-
begging; the reference to ‘ambiguity’ implies a choice between two representations of the 
stimulus; ‘optimism’ that the choice bears some affect. Spurious assumptions! Many things that 
opt for one action over another (including telephone cables and microcircuits) and that increase 
optimality are not thereby experiencing pleasure or optimism. 
We admit to being sometimes confused by M&P’s strategy of argument. They often 
express caution against leaping to conclusions on the basis of insufficient evidence but then 
proceed to do just that. Pointing the finger at "scientific uncertainty" about vertebrate 
consciousness does not help strengthen their case. They are certainly right in arguing that the 
same "evidentiary standard" should apply to vertebrates and invertebrates; but if they are also 
right about the lack of evidence for vertebrate consciousness, rationality would dictate 
withholding assent to claims about consciousness in both cases. The two cases are not 
symmetrical, however, because we have good reason, on the basis of structural homologies, to 
conclude about many vertebrate species that they are conscious. M&P’s retort that arguments 
from homology are baseless because all homology claims about brain regions are ultimately 
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based on behaviour—and so it is to similarities of behaviour not their structural bases that we 
should look to make judgements of sentience—is wildly out of step with fundamental principles 
of comparative neurobiology.  
We agree that comparing homologies of gross brain regions across phylogenetically 
distant species (e.g. between fish or insects and humans) is of limited value.  For comparative 
purposes, a different level of abstraction and approach is required. By identifying the algorithm 
(sequence of neural functions) necessary for subjective experience and then seeking to define 
the specific neural structures (e.g., neural architectures and neural circuitry) that could possibly 
execute that algorithm among different species, we can begin to make real progress. 
Experimental work on the visual system has already revealed that common algorithms are used 
in both insects and mammals (Borst and Helmstaedter, 2015). The principle that structure 
determines function is fundamental in biology. When examined at the appropriate level of 
analysis it can be a powerful tool for addressing the possibility of subjective experience in specific 
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